What does it mean to replicate an experiment? A distinction is often drawn between 'exact' (or 'direct') and 'conceptual' replication. However, in recent work, Uljana Feest argues that the notion of replication in itself, whether exact or conceptual, is flawed due to the problem of systematic error, and Edouard Machery argues that, although the notion of replication is not flawed, we should nevertheless dispense with the distinction between exact and conceptual replication. My plan in this paper is to defend the value of replication, along with the distinction between exact and conceptual replication, from the critiques of Feest and Machery. To that end, I provide an explication of conceptual replication, and distinguish it from what I call 'experimental' replication. On the basis, then, of a tripartite distinction between exact, experimental and conceptual replication, I argue in response to Feest that replication is still informative despite the prospect of systematic error. I also rebut Machery's claim that conceptual replication is fundamentally confused and wrongly conflates replication and extension, and in turn raise some objections to his own Resampling Account of replication.
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