Thought probes during prospective memory encoding: Evidence for perfunctory processes.

For nearly 50 years, psychologists have studied prospective memory, or the ability to execute delayed intentions. Yet, there remains a gap in understanding as to whether initial encoding of the intention must be elaborative and strategic, or whether some components of successful encoding can occur in a perfunctory, transient manner. In eight studies (N = 680), we instructed participants to remember to press the Q key if they saw words representing fruits (cue) during an ongoing lexical decision task. They then typed what they were thinking and responded whether they encoded fruits as a general category, as specific exemplars, or hardly thought about it at all. Consistent with the perfunctory view, participants often reported mind wandering (42.9%) and hardly thinking about the prospective memory task (22.5%). Even though participants were given a general category cue, many participants generated specific category exemplars (34.5%). Bayesian analyses of encoding durations indicated that specific exemplars came to mind in a perfunctory manner rather than via strategic, elaborative mechanisms. Few participants correctly guessed the research hypotheses and changing from fruit category cues to initial-letter cues eliminated reports of specific exemplar generation, thereby arguing against demand characteristics in the thought probe procedure. In a final experiment, encoding duration was unrelated to prospective memory performance; however, specific-exemplar encoders outperformed general-category encoders with no ongoing task monitoring costs. Our findings reveal substantial variability in intention encoding, and demonstrate that some components of prospective memory encoding can be done "in passing."