A defense of conscientious objection: Why health is integral to the permissibility of medical refusals.

Schuklenk, Smalling, and Savulescu put forth four conditions that delineate when conscientious objection is impermissible. Roughly, they argue for the following claim: if some practice is legal, standard, expected of a profession, and in the patient's interest, then medical professionals cannot refuse to perform the practice. In this essay, I argue that these conditions are not jointly sufficient to deny medical professionals the ability to refuse to perform procedures that detract from a patient's health. They are insufficient to bar medical refusals to perform certain practices because, even when these conditions are met, non-health conducive practices would not be open to refusal by the physician. I provide an example of a non-health conducive practice female genital mutilation, which meets all of the proposed conditions but, intuitively, should be open to medical refusals. As a result, I conclude that the proposed conditions are insufficient to determine when conscientious objection is impermissible. I then offer an amendment to their position by suggesting that a practice, in addition to the other four conditions, must also be health conducive in order to remove the medical professional's ability to refuse to perform the practice.