Normative force of appeals to personhood in dementia care: A critical examination of Kitwood's account of personhood.

In this paper, I critically examine Kitwood's account of personhood for people with dementia. His account has been influential in supporting appeals to personhood in both clinical and bioethical literature on dementia care. I demonstrate that Kitwood's account does not run into common objections against invoking personhood as a normative notion, namely, the objection of exclusionary implications and the objection of redundancy. I argue, however, that Kitwood's account suffers from two other major conceptual issues. These include (a) unreasonable social contingency, and thus, precariousness, of his notion of personhood for people with dementia; and (b) insufficient theoretical connection between his account of personhood and his proposed list of indicators of well-being for people with dementia. Despite these issues, I do not agree with the following view: that, in the context of dementia care, scholars should refrain from appealing to personhood considerations. Instead, I defend the view that while Kitwood fails to offer a compelling theoretical account of personhood of people with dementia, his empirically driven list of indicators of well-being and his notion of malignant social phycology seem to be sensitive to key ethical considerations relevant to dementia care. I propose that we pursue alternative ways of explaining what is morally (un) desirable about them without (explicit) appeal to personhood.