Imprecise probabilistic inference from sequential data.

Although the Bayesian paradigm is an important benchmark in studies of human inference, the extent to which it provides a useful framework to account for human behavior remains debated. We document systematic departures from Bayesian inference under correct beliefs, even on average, in the estimates by experimental subjects of the probability of a binary event following observations of successive realizations of the event. In particular, we find underreaction of subjects' estimates to the evidence ("conservatism") after only a few observations and at the same time overreaction after longer sequences of observations. This is not explained by an incorrect prior nor by many common models of Bayesian inference. We uncover the autocorrelation in estimates, which suggests that subjects carry imprecise representations of the decision situations, with noise in beliefs propagating over successive trials. But even taking into account these internal imprecisions and assuming various incorrect beliefs, we find that subjects' updates are inconsistent with the rules of Bayesian inference. We show how subjects instead considerably economize on the attention that they pay to the information relevant to the decision, and on the degree of control that they exert over their precise response, while giving responses fairly adapted to the task. A "noisy-counting" model of probability estimation reproduces the several patterns we exhibit in subjects' behavior. In sum, human subjects in our task perform reasonably well while greatly minimizing the amount of information that they pay attention to. Our results emphasize that investigating this economy of attention is crucial in understanding human decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).